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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
Appellant Thomas Tucker raises six issues in this appeal. Opening Brief of Appellant 
("Opening Brief'), pg. 3-4. The state has failed to refute any of them. 
A. The Court Erred by Partially Dismissing the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by 
Depriving Petitioner of His Right to Testify Claim on a Basis Not Found in Either the 
State's Motion for Summary Disposition or the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Without Giving Twenty-Days Notice 
The state argues that its Motion for Summary Dismissal of the Amended Petition gave 
Mr. Tucker sufficient notice of the reasons the district court dismissed his Second Amended 
Petition. Brief of Respondent ("State's Brief'), pg. 8. That is a curious position to take since the 
state's motion was filed before the filing of the Second Amended Petition. Thus, that motion 
could not have given notice of the basis to dismiss the not-yet-filed Second Amended Petition. 
There was an argument on the state's motion to dismiss the Amended Petition on March 10, 
2014, but the Second Amended Petition was not lodged until April 1, 2014, leave to file the 
Second Amended Petition was not granted until May 12, 2014, and the state never filed a written 
motion for summary dismissal of the Second Amended Petition. R 115; 135. 
Moreover, even when the state's argument as to why the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim should be dismissed is considered, it did not give notice of the alleged deficiency. It 
simply stated that the ineffective assistance of counsel allegations "do not have any supporting 
information sufficient to show that there was deficient performance by the attorney." R 100. 
That is mere boilerplate language and the state fails to allege with any specificity what 
information it claims should be provided. And it is not the same as the reason given by the court, 
i.e., that the "Petitioner has failed to support his claim with any evidence that the failure to call 
him as a witness was based upon ignorance of the relevant law, inadequate preparation or other 
shortcomings of objective evaluation." R 158. The state's attempt to characterize the court's 
ruling as merely a more specific version of its general argument is fallacious. Its argument did 
not give Mr. Tucker fair notice of the grounds upon which the court eventually dismissed his 
claim. 
As to the notice provided by the court, the ineffective assistance of counsel due to the 
denial of Petitioner's right to testify claim was not pleaded until the Amended Petition, R 81, 
while the court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss was filed prior to the filing of the Amended 
Petition. Thus, the court's notice did not address the ineffective assistance due to the deprivation 
of Petitioner's right to testify claim. See, R 39-45. Thus, neither the court's notice nor the state's 
motion gave Mr. Tucker notice of the first reason upon which the court dismissed the ineffective 
assistance claim. This was error under LC.§ 19-4906(b)-(c). Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 
P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 2009). 
B. Mr. Tucker's Verified Statement That He Told His Attorney That He Wanted to Testify 
at Trial But That Trial Counsel Rested the Case Without Calling Him to Testify 
Created a Genuine Issue of Material Fact That Trial Counsel's Performance Was 
Deficient 
The state accuses Mr. Tucker of making a new argument on appeal, State's Brief, pg. 9, 
but that is not the case. While Mr. Tucker's post-conviction counsel "explained to the court that 
'[c]ertainly it is within a defense's attorney's trial strategy not to have a client testify at his own 
trial," Id., (quoting T pg. 12, In. 7-9), the state fails to inform the Court that counsel goes on to 
say (in the very next line of the transcript) that "[w]hile that may be a trial - a sound trial strategy, 
it doesn't trump my client's right to actually testify at his trial. The decision really has to be 
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made by the client, not the attorney." T pg. 12, In. 7-13. On appeal, Mr. Tucker continues 
making this same argument by pointing out "[t]he right to testify is personal to the defendant and 
cannot be taken away by counsel even if counsel's reasons for wanting to do so are good. The 
decision whether to testify lies with the defendant and counsel must abide by the defendant's 
decision." Opening Brief, pg. 11 citing State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 778 P.2d 811 (Ct. App. 
811); see also, State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516,521, 708 P.2d 921,926 (Ct. App. 1985). (The 
decision of whether the defendant should testify is the "one exception" to the general rule that 
counsel's decision on what witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy.). 
Properly advising a client not to testify is one thing. Resting the defense case without 
calling the defendant knowing that the defendant wants to testify is altogether different. Barcella 
v. State, 148 Idaho 469,477,224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct. App. 2009), a case cited by the state, proves 
this point. In Barcella, "the district court distinguished between advising a client not to testify 
and preventing a client from testifying." Id. The Barcella district court also noted that the 
decision to testify is ultimately to be made by the accused. The district court determined that '[i]f 
Petitioner was not allowed to testify, trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard 
ofreasonableness and was deficient.' Therefore, the district court found that the first prong of 
Strickland had been met. Id. Thus, the district court ruled to the opposite of the Barcella trial 
court on substantially similar facts. The unrebutted evidence before the court here was that trial 
counsel knew that Mr. Tucker wanted to testify, but that he rested the defense case without 
calling Mr. Tucker to testify. That evidence was sufficient to establish a genuine question of 
material fact on the question of whether counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland 
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C. Further, the Court Erred by Finding That Mr. Tucker Had Not Adequately Pleaded 
That He Was Prejudiced by That Deficient Performance and by Applying a Too High 
of Standard for Showing Prejudice 
In the Opening Brief, Mr. Tucker argued that the court erred in finding that "[t]he 
Petitioner has not alleged that he suffered any prejudice - ie [sic], that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different," R 158, because the pleadings are clear that Mr. Tucker did allege he 
was prejudiced. See, R 118 (,r 21 of the Second Amended Petition: "Petitioner's testimony 
would have been considered by the jury in its deliberations and could have resulted in a favorable 
verdict for Petitioner."); and R 119 (,r 36 alleged: "Petitioner could have provided information 
for the jury to consider in its deliberations which could have resulted in a favorable verdict.") and 
R 124 (affidavit alleging facts the Petitioner would have testified to had he been called at trial). 
These allegations are sufficient to encompass the test for prejudice under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 689 (1984), that there be a "reasonable probability" of a different 
result, especially given the court's own misstatement of the test. 
Petitioner also argued that the court failed to apply the Strickland prejudice standard, 
which it believed required a showing "that the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
R 158. In fact, all Strickland asks is whether it is 'reasonably likely' the result would have been 
different. This does not require a showing that counsel's actions more likely than not altered the 
outcome[.]" Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (internal citations 
omitted). Opening Brief, pg. 13-14. The state does not attempt to argue that Harrington does 
not correctly state the legal standard. Instead, it repeats the mistake of the district court by 
arguing that "the testimony Tucker alleged he might have offered if called to testify at trial would 
not have changed the outcome of his trial." State's Brief, pg. 10. But again, Mr. Tucker is not 
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required to show that his testimony "would have" changed the outcome of the trial. In order to 
ultimately prevail he only needs to show that it is "reasonably likely" the result would have been 
different. Harrington, supra. Further, at the summary dismissal stage, he only needs to show 
that there is a material question of fact about whether he could make the Strickland-Harrington 
showing. Mr. Tucker's affidavit more than meets the minimal showing needed to avoid 
summary dismissal. Consequently, this Court should vacate the dismissal of the claim and 
remand for further proceedings. 
D. The Court Erred by Dismissing the Right to Testify Claim on a Basis Not Found in 
Either the State's Motion/or Summary Disposition or the Court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss Without Giving Twenty-Days Notice 
The state argues that its motion to dismiss the Amended Petition gave Mr. Tucker 
sufficient notice of its basis to dismiss the right to testify claim which was not raised until the 
Second Amended Petition. State's Brief, pg. 10 ("Tucker was on notice that he needed to 
support his claim with evidence."); pg. 11 (Tucker was on notice that there had to be some 
evidence of prejudice at least in relation to his other claims[.]") (second emphasis added). But 
argument on that level of abstraction was not sufficient to give Mr. Tucker sufficient notice of 
the state's possible future argument regarding the claim which had not been pleaded. In fact, 
neither the state nor court gave Mr. Tucker adequate notice. The state did not address the right to 
testify claim in its Motion for Summary Dismissal and the court also did not address that claim in 
its Notice oflntent to Dismiss. R 39-45 (court's notice); 97-102 (state's notice). (While the state 
notes that Mr. Tucker argued in support of his right to testify claim at the July 14, 2014, hearing, 
that in no way proves he received the required advance notice from either the state or the court.) 
Thus, the dismissal should be reversed for non-compliance with the notice requirement of LC. § 
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l 9-4906(b ). Buss v. State, supra. 
E. Mr. Tucker's Verified Statement That He Told His Attorney That He Wanted to Testify 
at Trial But That Trial Counsel Rested the Case Without Calling Him to Testify 
Created a Genuine Issue of Material Fact That He Was Deprived of His Right to 
Testify, Notwithstanding the Fact That the Court Advised Him Earlier in the Trial 
That He Had the Right to Testify 
The state argues that any error with regard to adequate notice is harmless "[b ]ecause the 
district court could properly dismiss [Mr.] Tucker's claim that he was deprived of his right to 
testify on the basis that his proposed testimony would not have affected the outcome of his 
trial[.]" State's brief, pg. 11. But again, that is not even a correct statement of the Strickland 
prejudice standard much less of the standard applicable to this claim. With regards to the right to 
testify claim, once Mr. Tucker established that his right was violated the burden shifted to the 
state to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Court of Appeals has 
explained: 
If viewed as a question of effective assistance of counsel, pursuant to Strickland 
v. Washington, the burden rests with the defendant both to identify the acts or 
conduct of counsel alleged to have been deficient and to show how such 
deficiency was prejudicial to the defense. However, if the failure of a defendant 
to testify is considered in the context of deprivation of a fundamental 
constitutional right, then pursuant to Chapman v. California, the defendant has the 
burden to show he or she was deprived of the right to testify, and the state must 
then convince the reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation 
did not contribute to the defendant's conviction-that it was harmless error. 
Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 704, 274 P.3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations omitted), 
citing Darb in, l 09 Idaho at 522, 708 P .2d at 927. The state never attempts to argue that the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman. 
As to the merits of the substantive claim, the state argues that "[t]o be deprived of his 
right to testify, [Mr.] Tucker had to assert his right to testify and then have been presented from 
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testifying." State's Brief, pg. 12. That is exactly what the unrebutted evidence shows. Mr. 
Tucker alleged that he told his attorney that he wanted to testify but that counsel rested the 
defense case without calling Mr. Tucker to testify. R 123. Defense counsel did not file an 
affidavit disputing any of Mr. Tucker's allegations. It is worth noting that the trial court did not 
advise Mr. Tucker that he had the right to testify irrespective of his counsel's wishes. The record 
from the criminal case shows that Mr. Tucker was advised that "the right to testify was his 
choice," not that "the decision whether to testify was his alone" as found by the court. R 162. 
Mr. Tucker did not understand he could override the unilateral decision of his attorney because 
he stated in his affidavit that "he does not believe that he was advised by the Court that he had a 
right to testify regardless of the desire of his attorney, and, had he known this, would have 
insisted on testifying." R 124. Thus, the evidence shows that Mr. Tucker asserted his right to 
testify by telling his attorney he wanted to do and was prevented from doing so by his attorney 
resting the defense case without calling him to testify. 
"In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly granted, a court 
must review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, and determine whether they 
would entitle petitioner to relief if true." Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 
795, 797 (1995); Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 177 P.3d 362,367 (2007). Taking the 
record and Mr. Tucker's allegations in the light most favorable to him this evidence creates a 
material issue of fact and summary disposition should not have been granted. The order 
dismissing this claim should be reversed. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 
1281 (2010). 
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F. This Issue Was Not Waived by the Failure to Raise it on Direct Appeal Because it 
Could Not Have Been so Raised 
Finally, Mr. Tucker argued that the district court erred by finding the right to testify issue 
had been waived for failure to raise the claim on appeal when, in fact, the claim could not have 
been raised for the first time on appeal under State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho at 523, 708 P.2d at 928 
and State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961, 978 (2008). Opening Brief, pg. 17-19. The 
state does not dispute this, instead it "assume[s Mr.] Tucker is correct that this is an appropriate 
claim for post-conviction and not direct appeal[.]" State's Brief, pg. 12. Thus, no reply is needed 
and the district court's dismissal under LC. 19-4901(b) cannot be affirmed under this rationale 
for the reasons previously argued. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Tucker respectfully requests that the order of 
summary disposition as to his claims that his counsel was ineffective for not calling him to testify 
and that he was deprived of his right to testify be reversed and the matter remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted th~ay of April, 2015. 
~LM"-~~~ ....... 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Thomas Tucker 
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